(4)
There is milk in the fridge. These are all ways someone might understand the sign. (2006: 114) Faced with this, one might despair, with Wittgenstein's interlocutor, that 'no course of action could be determined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to accord with a rule ' (1958: §201) . In contrast, Travis's response is that the circumstances-and in particular the purpose of the sign-determines that a certain understanding is called for. ' (2006: 118) .
The line of thought appears to be as follows. That a sign admits of different understandings-as saying various things-seems to threaten the idea that there is anything that counts as understanding it-that it says anything-at all. Fortunately, context comes to the rescue by determining that it should be understood in a certain way-as saying one of these things. Thus, to hold on to the thought that subjects can so much as say things in using language, or understand what is thereby said, one must accept contextualism.
No doubt there are many things one might challenge at this point-the intuitions about (4)'s variation in truth-conditions, for example, or the inference from the particular case to what can be said of linguistic expressions in general, or the cogency of the Wittgensteinian argument. I shall set these qualms aside. The present concern lies not with the reasons given in favour of contextualism, but with the view's consequences.
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A dilemma for deflationism ' (1996: 453) . That is, deflationism is committed to its being possible to explain what it is for words to express a proposition without making reference to the notion of truth (except in its role as a tool of generalisation). If such appeal were necessary, there would be more to truth-the concept of truth would have a more substantive, explanatory role to play-than deflationism allows.
Travis proceeds to object that the explanation given above rests on the assumption that-indexicality and the like aside-which proposition is expressed in an utterance of certain words 'is determined by what they mean. Part of their meaning what they do is that […] there is a particular proposition which is the one they would express ' (1996: 453) . At this point, unsurprisingly, Travis wheels in contextualism, reminding us that one and the same sentence, with the same meaning, might on different occasions of utterance, express different propositions. Hence, Travis concludes, since we have reason to accept contextualism, we must reject deflationism.
It must be said that Travis's argument is, as stated, rather opaque. Granting that the deflationist is required to say something about how words state truth, why is the deflationist's account of truth-stating, which Travis proffers, so much as ostensibly committed to the denial of contextualism? On that account, recall, 'for words to be true is (nothing more than) for them to express a proposition that is true'.
It is entirely possible to read this, in line with contextualism, as, 'for words on an occasion of utterance to be true is (nothing more than) for them on that occasion to express a proposition that is true'. It is simply an open question whether 'words' here picks out types or situationally-embedded tokens, and it is not obvious why Travis thinks that deflationism must read it in a way that conflicts with contextualism. 1996: 459; cf. 2000: 232) .
Deflationism seems to assume that there is a one-to-one correlation between any particular sentences and a worldly state of affairs (whose obtaining is the condition of the truth of that sentence).
This, however, is a serious misrepresentation of deflationism. Consider an instance of the equivalence schema:
(DS1) It is true that the pygmy shrew is Britain's smallest mammal if and only if the pygmy shrew is Britain's smallest mammal.
The words as they occur on the left-hand side, just as much as those on the right, are used not mentioned; that is, they are to be viewed as uttered on a particular occasion and hence as already understood in the appropriate way. The phrase, 'that the pygmy shrew is Britain's smallest mammal' is thus understood as, given the circumstances, naming a particular proposition, the same proposition expressed on this occasion by the words on the right-hand side, one of the many that those very same words might on various occasions be used to express. Hence, the deflationist does not need to bridge a gap between the 'mere description' on the left-hand side and the world as described on the right-hand side, since the left-hand side is already conceived as expressing a particular proposition; the circumstances have already made their contribution. 6 Travis's parenthetical qualification that the description on the left-hand side of it is for words to state truth, in a way compatible with contextualism, she must appeal to a notion of truth more substantive than that recognised by deflationism.
I shall not here comment on the first horn of the dilemma. It is certainly true that some deflationists hold that, for any (non-indexical, etc) sentence, the meanings of its constituents and how they are combined wholly determine that it expresses a particular proposition, with particular truth-conditions, when uttered (see Her claim is only that, whatever proposition is expressed, the conditions of its truth can be explained in the deflationary way.
Travis's suggestion is that it is specifically in explaining how circumstances come to bear on an utterance, and thereby what is expressed in it, that one will have to make reference to what truth is. Since this will be a substantive explanation, truth will have to be a substantive notion, contrary to deflationism. As Travis puts it, 'What truth is makes circumstances matter as they do to what, in them, would be said in words with given meanings ' (2000: 233) . Truth depends on what words mean, the way the world is, and further factors: aspects of the circumstances in which words were produced. Whether, and how, any given such factor matters to the truth of particular words must depend on what truth is; on the particular way speaking it requires words to relate to those factors (or vice-versa).
Further facts can matter at all, and then as they do, only if truth is a notion which demands, case by case, precisely those factors to be arranged in just those ways.
Deflationism cannot allow truth to make such demands. (1996: 454; cf. 2000: 230) The moot question concerns just what 'demands' or 'requirements' truth makes or imposes. Travis points to an answer to this when he writes,
To assess correctly the truth of words which described a ball as being round, one This last point connects to the common suggestion that a norm of truth constitutively governs assertion, in the sense that, for any p, one correctly asserts that p only if it is true that p. 10 A deflationist could certainly accept this suggestion, viewing it as a generalisation from the particular norms governing specific assertions, such as: one correctly asserts that the pygmy shrew is Britain's smallest mammal only if the pygmy shrew is Britain's smallest mammal; one correctly asserts that the whitetoothed shrew is Britain's smallest mammal only if the white-toothed shrew is Britain's smallest mammal; one correctly asserts that the white-toothed shrew is endangered only if the white-toothed shrew is endangered; and so on indefinitely.
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There is, of course, much to say about this proposal but the important point for present purposes is as follows. A deflationist can insist that, if anything, it is assertion rather than truth that is constitutively normative, in the sense that it belongs to the very idea of assertion, not that of truth, that a norm of the sort sketched above applies to acts of asserting. In support, one might note that, in characterising the norm (allegedly) governing assertion, the notion of truth seems to play a role only as a device of generalisation of the sort the deflationist draws our attention to. Moreover, assertion is a speech act and so just the sort of thing that can be straightforwardly purposive, where such purpose might generate standards (or 'demands') for subjects to meet.
Of course, if true, contextualism complicates this deflationism-friendly account of assertion somewhat by demonstrating that which particular norm governs a given act of asserting depends on what broader purpose that assertion is in the service of on a particular occasion (answering a query about breakfast supplies, for example).
But this serves to supplement the original account, rather than to undermine it.
With this in view, and returning to the issue at hand, consider the following remark by Travis:
Part of this idea [of truth] is that, for a description, and on an occasion […] , there are definite purposes truth demands be served, and uses which truth demands the description have in serving them. (1996: 463) It is open to the deflationist to reformulate this as follows:
Part of this idea of asserting is that, for a description, and on an occasion, there are definite purposes asserting demands be served, and uses which asserting demands the description have in serving them. Here Travis suggests that making a statement is 'intrinsically' purposeful, that it is the 'kind of thing' that has a point. Hence, making a statement serves its purpose when and only when the statement made is true (a generalisation that deflationism can allow). But Travis treats this as one with the claim that this need to serve a purpose is a consequence of what truth is. The deflationist can refuse to allow this slide.
Oxonian superstition
Travis challenges the deflationist to offer an account of how truth gets expressed, a challenge that results in a dilemma. But this dilemma, I argued, is not devastating for the deflationist. Elsewhere, Travis levels a quite distinct objection against deflationism, again based on contextualist considerations, which I shall reconstruct and assess in the remainder.
Travis admits that equivalences of the form (DS) are 'banal ' (2006: 173 if) this is correct, there 'could be no room for any fit between statements and that which they represent as so except for perfect or none ' (2006: 181-3) . Since, however, contextualism shows the supposition to be false, the Strawsonian view has to go, and with it deflationism (and the Dummettian view).
Note however, that, despite Travis's suggestion to the contrary, Strawson appears entirely sympathetic to contextualism, insisting that 'the question of whether a sentence or expression is significant or not has nothing to do with the question of whether the sentence, uttered on a particular occasion, is, on that occasion, being used to make a true-or-false assertion ' (2004: 7) . Moreover, Strawson's sympathy is well-founded, since the Strawsonian view is entirely compatible with contextualism.
The Strawsonian claims only that, when a statement is true, it 'fits' a fact perfectly; it is officially silent about how such a statement comes to be made. It might well be, with contextualism, that there is no one-to-one correlation between sentences and the statements one makes in uttering them, and so no one-to-one correlation between sentences and facts, but rather that the same sentence might be used to make different statements, and so fit perfectly different facts, on different occasions.
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Consider instead the reasons Travis offers for thinking that the Dummettian view is incompatible with contextualism. Since, as explained above, there is some Here, Travis opposes the Dummettian view. It might be the case, he claims, that a statement is made on a given occasion, a particular proposition expressed, and yet that proposition, bearing the particular understanding it does, is neither true nor false.
Note that this suggestion must be distinguished from the similar-sounding contextualist thought that it is possible for a meaningful sentence to be uttered and yet for no statement to be made. This might occur when, given the circumstances, using those words serves no purpose whatsoever. The possibility of such a scenario is not in conflict with deflationism, since it is one in which no proposition (that might provide an instance of (DS)) is expressed. The claim under consideration is, rather, that the circumstances might contribute to determining that a particular statement is made and yet, given the way the world is, that statement bears no truth-value. Travis offers the following illustration:
We are sitting in Jones' living room with Jones when suddenly, and quite unexpectedly, he dies. A moment later there is a knock at the door. We open and are asked, 'Is Jones home?'
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According to Travis, what one would say if one were to answer, 'Jones is at home,'
would be neither true nor false:
There are reasons for counting Jones as at home. There he is in his chair, for example.
There are reasons for counting him as not at home. He is dead. One might say that dead people are not-certainly do not live-anywhere, a forteriori not at home.
So, 'neither the reasons for, nor those against, counting Jones as at home outweigh their conflicting counterparts ' (1994: 169-70 them. But it is also contingent whether that understanding is refined enough so that on it words would be true (or false). (1994: 176; cf. 2006: 187) His suggestion is that, on an occasion of utterance, the circumstances might determine that a proposition is expressed but one not 'refined' enough for it to count, given how the world is, as true or false. Although the context provides a way of understanding what is said, that way might in turn be understood or 'refined' in various ways, some true and some false, and the context does not choose among them. What is said, the proposition expressed, lacks a truth-value when it is true on some of these refinements but false on as many others. So, there appears to be a way of developing the contextualist account of what words come to express on a given occasion of utterance that brings it into conflict with the Dummettian view and thereby deflationism (and the Strawsonian view).
While it is certainly true that a contextualist could provide some such explanation as to how what is expressed in an utterance might fail to possess a truthvalue, it seems equally possible for her to hold on to the Dummettian view by insisting that, while context determines which proposition is expressed in an utterance, whatever proposition is in fact expressed the world will be such as to render it either true or false. 17 This would be to say that, given a circumstance of utterance, the proposition expressed is always sufficiently refined for it to have a truth-value.
Moreover, on reflection, there appear to be some-if not decisive-reason for contextualists to maintain the Dummettian line. Recall that, for the contextualist, what proposition is expressed by certain words is determined in part by the purpose uttering them is perceived to be in the service of, and specifically by how subjects should expect the description offered to enable them to deal with their surroundings. This suggests that, for the contextualist, it is precisely the role of circumstances and in particular the purpose of utterance to provide a 'refined 2003: 19-20 . 16 Travis appears to suggest that, if one accepts the possibility of truth-value gaps, one should accept contextualism in order to avoid an otherwise fatal contradiction (see 1994: 171, 183; cf. Horwich 1990: 80; cp. Künne 2003: 331-333) . However, the present issue concerns whether the reverse holds, that is, whether contextualists must accept the possibility of truth-value gaps.
17 Of course, one might simply stipulate that contextualism is, not simply the view that a given expression might, depending on the circumstances, be understood to 
